Commentary/ Plotkin & Odling-Smee: Multiple-level evolution and sociobiology draws attention to the roles of learning, culture, and society in evolution. Insofar as it opposes the simple-minded genetic determinism so prevalent in this field, it shows a positive trend of thought, although it is somewhat surprising that the authors do not make reference to previous discussions of cultural transmission by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1978) or by Rao et at (1976) . However, P&O's paper has several shortcomings which make the alternative model they propose untenable.
Determinism and natural law. P&O advocate that the future course of evolution is "fundamentally unpredictable" because of the indeterminacy and randomness supposedly inherent in complex interactions within and between "levels" of their modeL They state boldly that "evolution is not a deterministic process."
It is instructive to refer to the opening sentence of the fifth chapter of Darwin's Origin ,of Species where he states: "I have hitherto sometimes s~ken as if the variations-so common and multiform widi organic beings under domesti cation, and in a lesser degree with those under nature -were due to chance. This, of course, is a wholly incorrect expres sion, but it serves to acknowledge plainly our ignorance of the cause of each particular variation."
The problem with a' proclamation of randomness and unpredictability is that it may merely reify the theorist's own lack of knowledge and understanding, thereby discouraging further efforts to investigate and analyse phenomena. P&O are quite right in theit; opinion that living systems entail a plethora of exceedingly complex interactions that can never be understood by simplistic sociobiology, but I think they are wrong in their despair about prospects of understanding this web of interaetions.
Furthermore, the present difficulty of predicting the future should not be made to weigh so heavily on only one aspect of the problem -the evolution of organic species. We cannot even predict what the inorganic environment will be like millenia from now, although the properties of this envi ronment, of course, depend to some extent on developments in the realm of life. At any rate, without an accurate estima tion of the conditions of life, it is impossible to predict the responses of living beings to changed conditions.
The complexity of the system shows the need for a great deal more investigation of nature and of real interactions before we retire to the armchair and pass judgment on nature.
Adaptation and natural selection. P & 0 assert that natural selection is "one of nature's universals," which evaluates "culturally derived adaptations in the same way as any other adaptation"; this implies that selection is the basis for all evolutionary progress.
There is no doubt that there can be competitive struggle between cultures that may even lead to the extinction of certain features of a culture. However, adaptation or innova tion and cultural transmission can also take place without selection. Because of the rapidity of cultural transmission throughout a population within an individual's lifetime, and because cultural innovations come into being as solutions for widespread problems (e.g. disease) in nonrandom ways, it is possible for a new adaptation to be universally adopted in short order. This does not free a species from the reality of natural selection, but it does show that adaptation and selec tion are two separate and distinct sources of evolutionary change. Through cultural adaptation and transmission, progress is possible without the need for part of the popula tion to fail. The conditions of living for the whole of society can be elevated.
The fundamental tautology. When P&O tell us that "one can never escape from natural selection," they seem to be using selection in its tautological sense: the most fit will propagate best; those that propagate best shall be called the most fit Darwin rose above this mundane level by that natural selection, which was obvious to almost was in fact a creative force, which could lead to the ment of a new species -something qualitatively from its ancestors.
P&O do not inform us about the fundamental evolution: speciation. In some places they try to why a species is well-adapted to the conditions of and now, and why certain historical changes may within a species. But on a central problem of theory today, the gradual or abrupt transition to a species, their model is silent.
P&O's speculations about genetic determination of Lng ability and the "capacity for culture" are topics of debate relating to attributes of human races and social and in the present target article these are topics simple terms that could easily be misunderstood
The gens-learning dichotomy. Like so many field (e.g., Lorenz) P&O adhere to the dogma that only two means of information acquisition and translmil!Si(] genes and learning. This reveals a rather narrow pefS}:1CC1 on heredity. Consider just three of the many nisms: Cytoplasmic inheritance (Grun 1976) involves mission of nonnuclear organelles and structural details mitochondria, endoplasmic reticulum, Golgi apparatus, membrane, etc. Certain of these contain their own D many do not. The key thing here is that cytoplasmic tures are not organized de novo by gene products acting disorganized pool of central intermediates. On the new structures are built using existing structures as (Lehninger 1967). The fertilized egg contains a diverse of structures in a well-organized cytoplasm,and non genetic components of heredity are reproduced and milted from old cells to new.
The position of a structure in the cell can be rr3lnSml'((e< new cells. This is clearly evident in protozoa, where gical modifications of the cilia in the cell surface are ated for many generations. The importance of tional information" is now being recognized in LW"Hl""'llU organisms as well (see Subtelny & Konigsberg 1979). Corballis & Morgan: "The Biological Basis of Human ality" BBS 2(2) 1978.] . In mammals, inheritance may also entail transmission viruses, antibodies or various chemicals directly from to offspring via placental transfer or the milk; even sion of an acquired immunity via the father has been (Steele 1979).
Thus P&O'sassertion that animals "cannot transmit their noncultural adaptations nongeneticalIy" is simply valid. This omission is especially serious because nong,en,el mechanisms of inheritance appear to be more chromosomal DNA-based mechanisms; they are Lamarckian in some instances.
Culture In a nutshell. P&O argue the interesting point natural selection makes no distinction "between a . and a noncultural adaptation within the same animal"; this similar to saying that selection acts on phenotypes, not types. This notion raises a very big question about meaning of culture. The authors consider culture to founded upon associative learning ability, but this leaves out a host of non genetic, nonlearning aspects that appear to function almost the same way that narrowly defined, does.
Consider an oak tree laden with acorns. The fact that tree has reached reproductive maturity proves that its ronment nurtures that particular species of oak. By its acorns onto fertile ground, the parent transmits one of its environment to its offspring. And what about nutrient-rich endosperm and the seed coat of the nut They are separate from the embryo proper, yet they Response/Plotkin & Odling-Smee: Multiple-level evolution and sociobiology from parent to offspring. nuclear genes and associative learning there is a SOCiobiologists, radical or otherwise, 'anything controversial in recognizing that evolu provide organisms " ... with some capacity for information gain and storage." Organs that use information are no less biological than those and use food. I suspect that the distinction levels 2 and [3 is a bit arbitrary, and that more levels recognized, but this would not affect their reason validity of the monolithic theory for phenotypic t these levels.
nothing arbitrary about level 4. P&O show that there is a novel process here and that level 4 special attention not needed at lower levels. process is cultural inheritance, which may be Lamarckian only in the special sense that inher te.\ltures are not coded in the genes, rather than in the that phenotypic features are being transcribed germ plasm. I can find no fault with the statement of necessary for cultural inheritance. Also, I accept comparisons between level-1 and level-4 modes " ..if·~n,,~ but I believe that P&O are led astray by a annr.~i,~tp some of the similarities. traits, memes as Dawkins's (1976) cited book are subject to natural selection -not because they fitness of organisms but because they are replica genes) and have a mechanism of inheritance. The ltS~lt~tion of memes is subject to the same rules and as the natural selection of genes. A gene may be selected without having developmental effects (by distortion, and other processes) or in spite of be considered unfortunate effects. Sexual compe example, may select for genes that reduce both viability and efficiency of resource ntilization by Likewise, cultural traits may be favorably selected consequences for biological fitness, well-being, or group survival. Astrology, celibate potlatch ceremonies, and the chewing of bubble a few examples. cultural fe-ature to prevail, it is necessary and suffi it to be effective at replicating itself in the environ by SOCiety. It is not necessary that it be adaptive for that society or any of its members. Note that P&O speak of cultural adaptive traits but nowhere recognize that cultural evolution can favor traits that are biologically maladaptive. They themselves clearly state the reason for this: the nongenetic mode of inheritance of cultural traits makes them partly independent of the fitness of their carriers. There may be societies in which Russian roulette would spread more readily than sound dietary innovations. P&O fail to recognize that the theory of evolution by natural selection is applicable wherever replicators arise, and that biological evolution based on those replicators called genes is merely a special case of the more general theory. The flaw in monolithic evolution, as they describe it, is that it is not monolithic enough. I fail to understand P&O's rejection of purpose at the level of the gene. The prevailing allele at a given locus owes its prevalence to an adaptive molecular structure. That structure is one of an astronomical number of possibilities, and it must be one of the best among all that have ever arisen at that locus, at getting itself replicated. This high level of functional effectiveness is the same sort of consideration that P&O use to argue that pink feet can have a teleonomic purpose. In fact, the argument is more reasonable for genes than for developed characters. All extant pink feet will soon be gone, but a gene with a role in the development of pink feet can grow ever more numerous througli evolutionary time. Natural selection reliably maximizes properties like adaptation, and fitness, and selfishness only at the level of the replica tors themselves (genes and memes). Such properties emerge at phenotypic and societal levels only with qualifications. The genetic mysticism that P&O condemn is preferable to the phenotypic mysticism that they condone.
Any comprehensive theory has limitations, and it is possible to identify a limitation and label it a flaw. Sociobiology is an attempt to explain social behaviors as adaptations to the environment, especially the social environment. It does not address questions of behavioral ontogeny except in the limited sense of recognizing that ontogenetic mechanisms, such as learning capacities, are developed characters that must have ultimate evolutionary explanations. P&O are right that the monolithic theory is of little help in establishing links among genes, development, learning and socioculture. Their quotation from Rosenblatt (1976) is also valid; we need a convincing way of relating these different levels of behavioral organization, and this need is not met by sociobiology. My guess is that their multilevel theory is a bit too abstract a level to constitute an effective beginning for a theory of behavioral ontogeny. If and when we gel a detailed scientific picture of the development of social behavior in human and other cultural animals, I would expect sociobiology to have a role in explaining phylogenetic variation in the details of that picture.
